

for 88

he does in at "stability"  
(on US side)

63-64 Nitzge talks about strat balance—  
as helping (or helping) at "lower" levels,  
without ever specifying FU threat or FU.  
(he clearly does want to prevent  
SU FS cap)

—the main real effect of which  
would be to threaten plausibly to  
prevent is con of US FU or else...  
not, really, out of blue  
or against US non-mre else...

It seems possible that he has always  
opposed "actual" FU, as he (like  
Adams — +AJV) has opposed exclusion  
which is FU/FS threat.



(w/ HAK's interpretation)  
was not: a threat of full-scale <sup>Preemption, Prevention,</sup> SIC  
Massive Retal was not just Dulles  
" " Ripiles

It was a threat of CSR or  
too are war.

" " a slogan, whiff,  
up that

"dictated, discriminatory": <sup>retort</sup> not SIC, moreover  
(It referred to use of too are war, FU,  
article NATO') - frequently discussed,  
kindred, in planned - from last on

(maybe not any Pres had a crisis:

Reason my not! (or, my, security!)

Word "massive" was misleading; it just  
meant "nuclear".

HAK, however, implied that FU could be  
advantageous to US in assuming SU responded  
with 2d-use: i.e. not just against  
SU allies (non-nuclear), but against SU forces,  
e.g. in Europe: too are war.

This was in (implausible) assum not to  
Dulles' "Massive Retal" (aimed at TU, including  
Korea, then, not NATO') but at <sup>(SAC)</sup> NATO strategy!



Dist. : US' FC strategy in Europe

("Mod, but indispensable")

and FC strategy (back-up) critical

Europe: less "mod" w/ot intervention,

but ready disproportionate to needs,

but in balance + risk,

still not always decisive (see VN);

and with alternatives.

(Dulles/Sec did not prepare enough

non-mv alternatives; Deans + R did).